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              NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1196
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CECIL ROHAN TANNASSEE,
Appellant
_________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                               District Judge:  The Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00344-01)
_________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
on March 26, 2004
Before:  FUENTES, SMITH and GIBSON,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 10, 2004)
______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Cecil Rohan Tannassee appeals the district court’s judgment convicting him of one
1Tannassee moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case
and at the conclusion of the evidence, contrary to the government’s assertion.  Our review
is therefore not for plain error, as the government urges.
2
count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).  He does not appeal the 168-
month sentence imposed by the district court.  Tannassee argues that the government did
not present sufficient evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and that he was prejudiced
by the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.  We affirm the district court’s judgment. 
With respect to Tannassee’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we deny it without
prejudice to his ability to raise the claim in a collateral proceeding.
Tannassee was convicted by a jury, and our review of the sufficiency of the
evidence in this situation is highly deferential.  We do not weigh the evidence or
determine the credibility of the witnesses.  United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 439 (3d
Cir. 2003).  We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, id.,
and “we will overturn a jury verdict only when the record contains no evidence,
regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).1
David Lopez was a cooperating witness who testified about his cocaine purchases
from Tannassee.  Lopez, who resided in Reading, Pennsylvania, traveled to Lehigh Acres,
3Florida in the fall of 2000 to search for a new cocaine supplier.  He met Tannassee, who
operated a small site construction business in Lehigh Acres, and told him of his search. 
After Lopez returned to Pennsylvania, Tannassee called him and said he was on his way
with “half a key” of cocaine.  Tannassee and Lopez met at a motel where Tannassee gave
him a suitcase filled with 500 grams of cocaine.  Lopez took the cocaine to his home,
where Matthew Folk met him and paid him $15,000 for it.  Lopez, in turn, gave $13,000
to Tannassee.  Lopez flew to Florida in January 2001 to get another 500 grams of cocaine
from Tannassee.  Tannassee rented a car for Lopez to drive himself back to Pennsylvania. 
Once home, he sold the cocaine to Folk for $15,000.  As Lopez was returning the rental
car to Florida, he was stopped for speeding in South Carolina.  In their search of the car,
police found and seized $15,865 in the trunk.  While he was seated in the patrol car,
Lopez called Tannassee on his cell phone and they discussed what he should say about
the money and his need for bail.
Over the next three months, Tannassee made four more deliveries to Lopez
totaling more than 6 kilograms of cocaine.  Lopez was arrested in his home on April 3,
2001 after he showed Folk some of the cocaine he had received from Tannassee.  Folk
had been arrested for selling cocaine one week earlier and had agreed to wear transmitting
and recording devices when he visited Lopez.  Following their arrests, both Lopez and
2The record does not reveal the specific charges to which either Lopez or Folk pled
guilty.
4
Folk agreed to testify against Tannassee.  Both had entered plea agreements2 and been
sentenced before Tannassee’s trial.  Lopez received a sentence of five years, which was at
most one-third of his possible sentence.  Folk was sentenced to 24 months, while he faced
a possible sentence of five years.
Tannassee alleges that the government failed to prove that a conspiracy existed and
that the evidence surrounding his interactions with Lopez proved nothing more than a
buyer-seller relationship between them.  However, we conclude that the government
introduced sufficient evidence of the elements of a conspiracy between Tannassee and
Lopez.  The record includes evidence of a unity of purpose between them, their shared
intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement that they would work together toward
that goal.  See United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2001).
Tannassee correctly states that a conspiracy is not proved merely with evidence of
sales agreements that form a buyer-seller relationship.  Rather, the government must show
that the coconspirators had some other goal that they agreed to work toward.  See United
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  This evidence may be entirely
circumstantial.  Id.  Here, the evidence showed that Lopez was looking for someone who
could consistently supply him with cocaine that he could resell, that Tannassee knew that
Lopez had ready buyers for the cocaine he would supply, and that Tannassee allowed
5Lopez to have the cocaine without paying for it because he trusted Lopez to pay him as
soon as he sold it.  Folk was Lopez’s biggest customer, and Tannassee met Folk on more
than one occasion when he brought cocaine.
With respect to Folk, Tannassee asserts that the government proved no conspiracy
with him or Lopez.  Although the indictment refers to both Lopez and Folk, the
government needed only to prove that Tannassee conspired with one of them in order to
obtain a conviction.  Pressler, 256 F.3d at 149 (“The Government needed to show only
that [the defendant] conspired with ‘someone--anyone.’”  (quoting United States v.
Obialo, 23 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a
jury could convict Tannassee of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute cocaine.
Tannassee also argues on this direct appeal that we should consider his claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  He alleges that his trial counsel failed to argue the
sufficiency of evidence of a conspiracy, and that he put Tannassee on the stand and
introduced character evidence without seeking to prevent the introduction of Tannassee’s
prior convictions.  The record before us is inadequate for the purpose of evaluating
Tannassee’s claim, and we therefore deny it without prejudice to his right to raise it on
collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).  United States v. Thornton, 327
F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2003).
6We will affirm the judgment of the district court.  We will dismiss Tannassee’s
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel without prejudice to his right to bring the
claim in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
